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I. INTRODUCTION 
Who will guard the guards themselves? Who watches the watch-
men? Though actually written by the Roman poet Juvenal, the Latin 
phrase, quis custodiet ipsos custodies, was thought to embody the para-
dox found in Plato’s Republic where the elite warrior-guardian class was 
in charge of protecting the civilian polity.1 Unlike Plato’s Republic, the 
guardians of the civilian polity in the United States are not ruling elite, 
but instead, an all-volunteer force drawn from across the nation. Today, 
the 2,266,8832 men and women currently serving in the U.S. Armed 
Forces are our friends, brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, husbands, 
wives, mothers, and fathers. Yet, who protects those who protect the na-
tion? Who ensures that they are provided a system where their grievanc-
es can be heard and crimes against them can be prosecuted? 
In the United States, these responsibilities are levied upon the U.S. 
Congress, which has Constitutional authority to “make rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”3 As such, the U.S. 
military currently has a robust and well-developed judicial system gov-
                                                            
* Captain Danielle Rogowski currently serves as an Aircraft Maintenance Officer in the United 
States Air Force. J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2015; M.A. University of Okla-
homa, 2011; B.S. Political Science, United States Air Force Academy, 2009. Many thanks to Prof. 
Brooke Coleman. 
 1. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & James A. Robinson, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian 
Control Over the Military, 8 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 655, 663 (2010). 
 2. By The Numbers: Today’s Military, NPR (July 3, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/03/ 
137536111/by-the-numbers-todays-military. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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erned by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Yet critics have 
attacked this system during the past two decades by alleging that it fails 
to adequately prevent and prosecute sexual assault within the ranks. Fol-
lowing scandals at the 1991 Tailhook Convention, Aberdeen Proving 
Grounds, and the United States Air Force Academy, critics of the mili-
tary justice system wrote several articles calling for reform.4 While the 
government subsequently enacted several initiatives in response to this 
criticism,5 recent events clearly demonstrate that there is still significant 
work to be done regarding sexual assault in the armed forces. This Note 
has two primary purposes. The first is to chronicle recent events in the 
U.S. military’s ongoing battle against sexual assault within the ranks, 
including several recent reforms to the military justice system. The se-
cond is to advocate for the use of a technical decisionmaking process, 
instead of recent Congressional reliance on individual narratives, to con-
sider whether major reform that removes a military commander’s charg-
ing decision authority is appropriate. 
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the initial incidents 
listed above and continues the story by discussing the recent sexual as-
sault scandal at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB).6 Examination of these 
incidents in brief evidences the fact that there are still ongoing systemic 
flaws in the armed forces when it comes to the prevention and prosecu-
tion of sexual assault. Part III discusses recent efforts to hold senior De-
partment of Defense (DoD) officials responsible for the prevalence of 
sexual violence in the armed forces through the civil justice system and 
the reluctance of the Judicial Branch to involve itself in military affairs. 
Of the three branches of government, the Judicial Branch has typically 
been viewed as a safeguard for individual liberty. Yet, Part III demon-
strates the propensity for the courts to prioritize national security con-
cerns in civil litigation over individual interests. Part IV details recent 
small-scale changes in the workings of the military justice system and 
examines two of the more controversial articles in the Uniform Code of 
                                                            
 4. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Military Sex Scandals From Tailhook to the Present: The 
Cure Can Be Worse Than the Disease, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 749 (2007); Jessica L. Cor-
nett, The U.S. Military Responds to Rape: Will Recent Changes Be Enough, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 99 (2008); Tara D. Zickefoose, Battling the Unforeseen Enemy: The Constitutional Attack on 
Military Sexual Assault, 48 TULSA L. REV. 143 (2012). 
 5. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is responsible for oversight 
of the Department of Defense’s sexual assault policy. Detailed information on all current and prior 
Department of Defense actions taken to prevent and respond to sexual assault is posted on their 
website: http://www.sapr.mil. 
 6. See infra Part II.D. 
2015] Sexual Assault Reform Within the U.S. Military 1141 
Military Justice, Article 60 and Article 120.7 The reforms discussed in 
Part IV demonstrate the difficulties in finding the appropriate balance 
between individual interests and national security concerns when it 
comes to military justice. Part V examines the current legislative debate 
that proposes large-scale changes to the military justice system, namely 
eliminating the authority of military commanders to make the charging 
decision with regard to sexual offenses. Taking into account the ideas 
discussed in Parts II–IV—that there are current and historical flaws in 
the way the military justice system prosecutes sexual offenses, that indi-
vidual interests are historically placed after national security concerns, 
and that finding the appropriate balance when it comes to military justice 
reform is inherently difficult—Part V advocates for changing the current 
debate to include a technical analysis as to military capabilities and the 
role of the commander. Part V also details an example of a 
decisionmaking process that can be used to seemingly de-escalate the 
current highly charged emotional debate into a balanced discussion that 
will produce a just result for individual service members while at the 
same time preserving military readiness. Part VI concludes. 
II. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY 
Today, the 214,098 women8 currently serving in the Department of 
Defense and the U.S. Coast Guard make up approximately 14.6% of 
America’s active duty military force.9 At present, more than 90% of all 
career fields in the U.S. military are open to women,10 and this percent-
age is expected to increase with the passage of recent legislation.11 Even 
before the formal opening of military service to women, historical rec-
                                                            
 7. Article 60 is the provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice that once allowed a 
Court-Martial Convening Authority to dismiss charges and change the sentencing orders made by a 
court-martial. Article 120 is the primary article under which all sexual offenses are prosecuted in the 
military justice system. See infra Part IV. 
 8. It is important to note that there are a substantial number of male victims of sexual assault 
within the U.S. military as well. However, due to the largely unreported nature of the crime and the 
fact that female victims vastly outnumber their male counterparts, this Part uses statistics involving 
female victims to describe the current state of sexual assault within the military. For information on 
male sexual assault in the armed forces, see, for example, Matthew Hay Brown, Breaking the Si-
lence, THE SUN (Dec. 14, 2013), http://data.baltimoresun.com/military-sexual-assaults/; James Dao, 
In Debate Over Military Sexual Assault, Men Are Overlooked Victims, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/us/in-debate-over-military-sexual-assault-men-are-overlooked-
victims.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 9. Statistics of Women in the Military, WOMEN IN MIL. SERV. FOR AM. MEMORIAL FOUND., 
INC. (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.womensmemorial.org/Press/stats.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Chris Lawrence, Pentagon to Open Combat Jobs to Women, CNN (Jan. 26, 2013, 
3:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/23/us/combat-jobs-women/. 
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ords demonstrate the participation of women in every major American 
military conflict since the Revolutionary War.12 
Yet despite this distinguished record of service, the sad truth re-
mains that “women serving in the U.S. military today are more likely to 
be raped by a fellow soldier than killed by enemy fire in Iraq.”13 In 2012, 
the Department of Defense14 received 3,374 formal reports of sexual as-
sault within the DoD in that year alone.15 Even more shocking, the DoD 
admitted that due to the highly unreported nature of the crime, studies 
placed the actual number of sexual assaults that year somewhere around 
26,000.16 Perhaps the best way to understand the U.S. military’s battle 
against sexual assault is through an overview of the highly publicized 
scandals in recent history. While individual sexual offenses are no less 
important, taken together, these separate incidents demonstrate common 
threads in the propensity for sexual offenses to occur and the difficulties 
involved in prosecution of those offenses due to the unique power rela-
tionships that are found within the military rank structure. The following 
analysis is merely a brief overview of the major sexual assault scandals 
that have affected the U.S. military during the past two decades. In addi-
tion to the statistics cited above, even a cursory examination of these in-
cidents evidences the fact that there is still much work to be done regard-
ing the prevention and prosecution of sexual assault in the armed forces. 
A. Tailhook (1992) 
Until the 1992 “Tailhook” scandal, the difficulties faced by female 
service members were largely unknown. The scandal was named for the 
September 1991 Tailhook Association convention that occurred at the 
Las Vegas Hilton and was attended by some 4,000 participants—
including thirty-two active duty Navy admirals and Marine Corps gener-
als.17 Tailhook was perhaps the public’s first glimpse into what has been 
                                                            
 12. Highlights in the History of Military Women, WOMEN IN MIL. SERV. FOR AM. MEMORIAL 
FOUND., INC., http://www.womensmemorial.org/Education/timeline.html (last visited Feb. 14, 
2014). 
 13. Michael Winerip, Retro Report: Revisiting the Military’s Tailhook Scandal, Testimony of 
Rep. Jane Harman, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/booming/ 
revisiting-the-militarys-tailhook-scandal-video.html. 
 14. It is important to note that the U.S. Coast Guard is presently aligned under the Department 
of Homeland Security and is no longer a part of the Department of Defense. Therefore, the author 
uses the term “armed forces” to refer to all branches of the U.S. military, including the U.S. Coast 
Guard, whereas the use of the term Department of Defense typically excludes the U.S. Coast Guard. 
 15. Winerip, supra note 13. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Kingsley R. Browne, Military Sex Scandals From Tailhook to the Present: The Cure Can 
Be Worse Than the Disease, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L & POL’Y 749, 751 (2007). 
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described as “an out of control fraternity party” that involved the nation’s 
top military aviation professionals.18 
The most infamous of the activities occurred on Saturday night. A 
‘gauntlet’ . . . —a double line of male aviators, one on each side of 
the hallway—was set up, and those women who had the . . . misfor-
tune . . . of finding themselves in the hallway were fondled and 
groped as they walked through.19 
Later, investigators determined that eighty-three women and seven men 
had been sexually assaulted.20 While the investigation was plagued with 
problems,21 the initial lack of prosecutions (or perceived lack of prosecu-
tions) led many to call into question—for the first time—the U.S. Navy’s 
ability and willingness to bring perpetrators of such crimes to justice.22 
B. Aberdeen Proving Grounds (1996) 
The U.S. military faced its next sexual assault scandal in 1996, a 
scandal that demonstrated that the military’s struggles with sexual assault 
were not limited to the Navy and Marine Corps. Investigators discovered 
that the drill sergeants at Aberdeen Proving Grounds (then home of the 
U.S. Army Ordinance Training Center and School) were participating in 
what was called “the GAM,” a contest to see which drill sergeant could 
sleep with the most trainees.23 In his book chronicling the investigation, 
Major General (ret.) Robert Shadley noted that the sergeants felt they 
were “pretty good at picking out the young women who would sleep with 
them” as he later found that “51 percent of the women who came into the 
Army exhibited several criteria for being victims of sex abuse.”24 Unlike 
the prior Tailhook scandal, which concerned the debauchery of similar 
ranked military aviators, the abuse at Aberdeen showcased another dis-
turbing aspect of military sexual assaults: the propensity for a drill ser-
geant’s authority over a young 19-year-old recruit to be abused.25 Unique 
                                                            
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Winerip, supra note 13. 
 21. For a discussion about the reliability of testimony and the difficulties involved, see 
Browne, supra note 17, at 752–56. 
 22. Winerip, supra note 13. 
 23. Bryana Zumer, Retired APG General: The Players Change but the ‘GAM’ Remains the 
Same, BALTIMORE SUN (May 23, 2013), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/harford/ 
aberdeen-havre-de-grace/ph-ag-military-scandal-0524-20130522-story.html. For a comprehensive 
overview of the scandal, see ROBERT D. SHADLEY, THE GAME: UNRAVELING A MILITARY SEX 
SCANDAL (2013). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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to the military, rank structure and imbalances in power created an entire-
ly new dimension with regard to sexual offenses. In total, nearly fifty 
women made sexual abuse charges, with twenty-six rape accusations.26 
In the end, the Army brought charges against twelve instructors; only one 
was cleared, and the remaining eleven were convicted via court-martial 
or punished administratively.27  
C. U.S. Air Force Academy (2003) 
With the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army already gripped in scan-
dal, reports that female cadets were being deterred from reporting sexual 
assault at the United States Air Force Academy left no doubt that the 
problem had permeated throughout the armed forces.28 In 2003, twenty-
two women made formal accusations that academy officials not only 
failed to investigate reports of sexual assault, but also actively discour-
aged women from filing reports of abuse and retaliated against them 
when they did.29 Sadly, it appeared that the refusal to investigate and 
prosecute reports of sexual misconduct was standard operating proce-
dure. The investigation later disclosed that older female cadets were ad-
vising young survivors of sexual assault not to report instances of mis-
conduct because it would get them expelled from the school.30 This time, 
reaction was swift as Air Force officials replaced Lt. Gen. John 
Dallanger, the commanding officer of the institution, and three other top 
officers from the academy in April of that same year.31 While Lt. Gen. 
Dallanger maintained that he was being transferred and not removed, a 
statement issued by then-Secretary of the Air Force James Roche ex-
plained that Lt. Gen. Dallanger was being stripped of one of his three 
stars and that he would be retiring at the rank of Major General, which 
left little doubt that the removal was disciplinary in nature.32 
                                                            
 26. The List: Military Scandals, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, available at https://web.archive 
.org/web/20110111082441/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/8/list-military-
scandals/. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Cathy Booth Thomas, Conduct Unbecoming, TIME (Mar. 6, 2003), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,428045-2,00.html. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Diana Jean Schemo, Ex-Superintendent of Air Force Academy is Demoted in Wake of Rape 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 12, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/12/us/ex-superintendent-of-
air-force-academy-is-demoted-in-wake-of-rape-scandal.html. 
 32. Id. 
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D. Lackland Air Force Base (2013) 
Ten years later, a scandal at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB) would 
lead the American public to wonder whether the Air Force and the U.S. 
military had truly learned their lessons from the prior Tailhook, Aber-
deen, and the Air Force Academy incidents. Despite years of reform, 
countless new policies, trainings, and zero tolerance statements, the U.S. 
military once again found itself gripped in yet another sexual assault 
scandal. Similar to the previous scandals, abuse of power became a 
common theme as female Air Force trainees made allegations of sexual 
assault against a dozen military training instructors (MTIs).33 In the 
summer of 2013, roughly thirty-one female trainees at Lackland AFB, 
the home of the Air Force’s Basic Military Training (BMT) Program, 
alleged incidents ranging from inappropriate Facebook posts to dorm 
room rapes.34 The allegations led Lackland AFB commanders to remove 
thirty-five instructors from their posts and implement multiple changes in 
the BMT program including the establishment of a new hotline for the 
reporting of inappropriate contact, new comment boxes to allow for 
anonymous reports of abuse, and several other major policy changes re-
garding the way MTIs were selected and trained.35 This time, reaction 
came from the highest authority in the U.S. military, as President Obama 
made his stance on the issue clear during a speech at Camp Pendleton: “I 
want you to hear it directly from me, the commander-in-chief, it under-
mines what this military stands for . . . when sexual assault takes place 
within.”36 The President further expressed his frustration with the issue 
by explaining, “I don’t want just more speeches or awareness programs 
or training, but ultimately, folks look the other way. If we find out some-
body is engaging in this stuff, they’ve got to be held accountable—
prosecuted, stripped of their positions, court-martialed, fired, dishonora-
bly discharged. Period.”37 The actions at Lackland AFB proved that 
years of mandatory sexual assault educational programs, the creation of 
resources for sexual assault survivors, and implementation of new poli-
                                                            
 33. Rick Jervis, Sex-Assault Scandal Casts a Pall over Lackland AFB, USA TODAY (July 20, 
2013), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-07-19/lackland-air-force-sex-scand 
al/56332956/1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Jeff Mason, Obama: Military Sexual Assault ‘Undermines’ What We Stand For, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/07/obama-military-
sexual-assault_n_3721679.html. 
 37. Lolita C. Baldor, Chuck Hagel Looks to Blunt Obama Military Sexual Assault Comments, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/15/chuck-hagel-
obama_n_3763084.html. 
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cies at all levels of command have not yet served to curb the problem of 
large-scale sexual assault in the U.S. military. 
In sum, examination of these incidents in brief, combined with re-
cent statistics showing that sexual assault continues to be a problem 
within all branches of the military,38 evidences the fact that there are still 
ongoing systemic flaws in the armed forces when it comes to the preven-
tion and prosecution of sexual assault. 
III. CIVIL REMEDIES AND THE JUDICIAL BRANCH’S RELUCTANCE TO 
“RUN THE ARMY” 
Historically, courts have been reluctant to involve themselves in 
military affairs. As the Court explained in 1983, “Judges are not given 
the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels 
through which . . . grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests 
upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his 
subordinates.”39 Victims of sexual assault have responded to recent criti-
cism of the military justice system’s perceived failings with regard to the 
handling of allegations of sexual assault by bringing civil claims against 
senior Department of Defense (DoD) officials.40 Through the use of a 
civil remedy known as a “Bivens” claim,41 sexual assault victims have 
charged senior DoD officials with failing to establish a justice system in 
which grievances can be brought and tested with all due process re-
quirements.42 In response, federal courts have reiterated their desire to 
remain independent of any military justice concern and maintained their 
traditional stance that control of the armed forces is best left to the Exec-
                                                            
 38. See infra Part IV. 
 39. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983). 
 40. See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2013); Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
 41. “In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme 
Court held that a violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights by federal officers, acting under 
the color of federal law, gives rise to a federal cause of action for damages for the unconstitutional 
conduct. As a rule, subject to certain exceptions, victims of a violation of the Federal Constitution by 
a federal officer have a right under Bivens to recover damages against the officer in federal court 
despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right. Such suits are commonly referred to as 
‘Bivens actions.’” Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Bivens Actions—United States Supreme 
Court Cases, 22 A.L.R. FED. 2D 159 (2007); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that violation of a Constitutional command by a 
federal agent acting under the color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages con-
sequent upon his unconstitutional conduct) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803): 
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the pro-
tection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”). 
 42. See Cioca, 720 F.3d 505; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8. For a detailed explanation of these 
claims, see infra text accompanying notes 58–61. 
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utive and Legislative Branches.43 After examining earlier civil suits in-
volving criminal conduct by military officials, civil suits regarding racial 
discrimination, and the more recent civil suits brought by victims of sex-
ual assault, it becomes clear that any remedy sought by military victims 
of sexual assault will not come from the civilian federal court system. 
Furthermore, the rationale of the judiciary in denying service members’ 
claims leads one to conclude that when individual remedial interests and 
national security interests conflict, national security appears to trump 
individual concerns. 
The Supreme Court first recognized the relationship between the 
government and service members as “special” in Feres v. United States, 
where a service member’s executrix was unsuccessful in recovering 
money damages for the government’s role in a negligent barracks fire 
that ultimately led to the service member’s death.44 The Court not only 
stated that a unique relationship existed between the government and 
military personnel, but further explained that this relationship reduced, 
and in most cases eliminated, the government’s liability to service mem-
bers.45 In subsequent decisions, the Court examined the “special relation-
ship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such 
suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits un-
der the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or neg-
ligent acts committed in the course of military duty.”46 Furthermore, in 
the 1981 case Stanley v. CIA, the Fifth Circuit considered the tort claim 
of a U.S. Army soldier who was given LSD as part of a volunteer pro-
gram to aid in the Army’s development of defense methods against 
chemical warfare.47 As a result of negligent administration of the pro-
gram, Master Sergeant Stanley suffered tremendous consequences to his 
personal life.48 Ignoring the facts that the program was “so patently ille-
gal that it could not be considered activity incident to service,” the sol-
dier had “volunteered to participate in the experimental program in lieu 
                                                            
 43. See Cioca, 720 F.3d 505; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8. 
 44. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 45. Id. at 143–46. The Court also noted that Congress, through prior enactments, had already 
provided to service members “simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of 
those in the armed services.” Id. at 144. Furthermore, the absence of adjustment to any of these 
remedies was persuasive in determining that Congress had no intent for the Federal Tort Claims Act 
to apply to injuries incident to military service. Id.  
 46. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). 
 47. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 48. Id. at 1149. Stanley, a Master Sergeant in the United States Army, claimed that he suffered 
“severe physical and mental injuries which caused him continual problems in the performance of his 
military duties and ultimately disrupted his marriage” due to the failure of the government to moni-
tor and debrief him after testing. Id. 
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of his regular duties,” and that the program was “not the kind of activity 
which might reasonably be anticipated as ancillary to military service,” 
the Court found that the Feres doctrine applied, thereby rendering the 
United States immune from suit.49 
Later on, the consequences of the unique relationship articulated in 
Feres would expand considerably to limit liability in cases brought under 
the newly formed Bivens remedy.50 When it created the Bivens remedy 
against federal officials, the Court was careful to note that the case at 
hand involved, “no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress.”51 As a result, courts were able to use the 
presence of previously unarticulated “special factors counseling hesita-
tion” in combination with the Feres doctrine, to further limit government 
liability in future cases.52 In Chappell v. Wallace, a suit by four enlisted 
men against their superior officers for racial discrimination, the Court 
listed the “unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment” 
and congressional activity regarding the formulation of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as “special factors.”53 Based on these 
factors, the court concluded “it would be inappropriate to provide enlist-
ed military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior offic-
ers.”54 
Despite the widespread public interest in eliminating racial discrim-
ination from all public spheres, when it came to the military, the Court 
explained, there was no action the judiciary could take: 
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of 
governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left 
to the political branches directly responsible—as the Judicial 
Branch is not—to the electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to 
conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts 
have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional deci-
sions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a 
military force are essentially professional military judgments, sub-
ject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appro-
                                                            
 49. Id. at 1152–53. 
 50. For an explanation of Bivens actions, see A.L.R, supra note 41. 
 51. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 
(1971). 
 52. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983). 
 53. Id. at 304. 
 54. Id. 
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priately vested in branches of government which are periodically 
subject to electoral accountability.55 
Although, as former Chief Justice Warren explained, “our citizens in uni-
form may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed 
their civilian clothes,” the fact remained that the Court felt it was unable 
to adequately determine the impact its decisions would have on military 
discipline.56 This reality, combined with the fact that Congress had al-
ready created the military justice system to address the grievances of ser-
vice members, meant that, for the most part, courts were unavailable to 
provide remedies for wrongs suffered in the armed forces. 
In deciding that federal courts were unable to provide remedies for 
wrongs suffered in the armed forces, the Court relied, in large part, on 
the availability for service members to utilize the military justice system 
to provide a redress for grievances.57 Recent civil litigation, however, 
alleged that the military justice system was inadequate and as a result, 
victims of sexual crimes were unable to receive relief for harms suffered 
at the hands of federal officials. In 2013, twenty-eight current and former 
members of the armed forces brought suit against former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his successor, Robert Gates.58 In their 
Bivens claim, the plaintiffs in Cioca v. Rumsfeld alleged that the former 
secretaries’ acts and omissions in their official capacities contributed to a 
“culture of tolerance” in the military for the sexual crimes perpetrated 
against the plaintiffs.59 Decided in the same year, Klay v. Panetta sought 
to hold senior DoD officials responsible for “creating and maintaining a 
hostile military environment that permitted sexual assault and retaliation 
to continue unabated.”60 Unlike Chappell and prior cases, Cioca and 
                                                            
 55. Id. at 302 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (emphasis in original)). 
 56. Chief Justice Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 
187–88 (1962). 
 57. “It is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch has plenary con-
trol over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the military establishment, including 
regulations, procedures and remedies related to military discipline; and Congress and the courts have 
acted in conformity with that view.” Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300. 
 58. See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2013); see also THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain 
Camera Pictures, Rise Films 2012) [hereinafter THE INVISIBLE WAR]. 
 59. Cioca, 720 F.3d at 507–08. 
 60. Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2013). In the complaint, plaintiffs charged 
Senior DoD officials with: (1) failing to implement certain congressional and statutory mandates 
designed to reduce sexual assault in the military; (2) a lack of leadership in the face of a known 
climate that condoned and perpetuated violence and retaliation against service members; (3) failing 
to “take any steps, let alone systemic and effective steps, to identify and punish the personnel who 
retaliated against” those who reported sexual assault; (4) granting moral waivers that permitted fel-
ons to serve in the military; (5) presiding over a dysfunctional system that permitted all but a small 
handful of rapists to evade any form of incarceration; (6) allowing military commanders to interfere 
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Klay went one step further by alleging that the system established by 
Congress to handle the grievances of sexual assault victims was so inef-
fective that it grossly violated the victims’ right to due process of law.61 
While acknowledging the severity of the plaintiffs’ allegations, the 
court remained firm in its deference to Congress and the Executive 
Branch’s control in matters regarding military oversight.62 Looking back 
to the rationale used in Stanley, the court explained that if Congress had 
wanted service members to have a remedy in the civil court system for 
injuries sustained while on active duty, it would have created one.63 The 
fact that Congress had not expressly created such a remedy in the twenty-
five years since Stanley was decided, the court concluded, was evidence 
of congressional intention regarding the control of military affairs.64 As 
the Constitution explicitly allocated oversight of the military to the Leg-
islative and Executive Branches, such intention by Congress was entitled 
to the utmost deference.65 
In sum, as noted constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky ex-
plained, “the law is now settled that Bivens suits are never permitted for 
constitutional violations arising from military service, no matter how 
severe the injury or how egregious the rights infringement.”66 Examina-
tion of early civil suits involving criminal conduct by military officials, 
civil suits regarding racial discrimination, and the more recent civil suits 
brought by victims of sexual assault suggests that any remedy sought by 
military victims of sexual assault will not come from the judiciary. The 
above-chronicled cases further suggest that when individual remedial 
interests and national security interests—in the form of military readi-
ness—conflict, national security appears to trump individual concerns. 
Even the judiciary, the very branch of government created to protect 
against the “tyranny of the majority,”67 seems unwilling to assist, leading 
                                                                                                                                     
with the impartiality of criminal investigations; (7) accepting nonjudicial punishment of alleged 
violators; (8) allowing alleged rapists to be charged with adultery instead of rape; (9) ensuring that 
military, and not civilian, authorities investigated and prosecuted rape and sexual assault charges; 
(10) failing to accurately report the conviction rates of rape in the military; and (11) permitting the 
destruction of forensic evidence. See Amended Complaint, Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8 
(D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-00350), 2012 WL 5356589. 
 61. See Cioca, 720 F.3d 505; Klay, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8. 
 62. Cioca, 720 F.3d at 517–18. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 517. 
 65. Id. at 517–18. 
 66. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 621–22 (5th ed. 2007). 
 67. Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court: The Court and Democracy, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wnet/supremecourt/democracy/history.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015). 
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to the conclusion that service members must look elsewhere for relief 
from harms suffered. 
IV. SMALL-SCALE CHANGES TO THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Recent policy decisions and legislative actions have shown that the 
Department of Defense and Congress are open to military justice reform. 
However, finding the appropriate balance has proven to be difficult. Un-
like its civilian counterpart, the military justice system must, in addition 
to providing a forum for the redress of individual wrongs, serve as a tool 
for commanders to maintain good order and discipline, and thus combat 
readiness, in their units. This Part details recent small-scale changes in 
the workings of the military justice system and examines two of the more 
controversial articles in the UCMJ: Article 60 and Article 120. Despite 
significant improvement, Part IV concludes that finding the appropriate 
balance between individual interests and national security concerns in the 
context of military justice reform is inherently difficult. 
A. Initial Disposition Authority: Why Service Members Are Not  
Guaranteed Their Day in Court 
The military justice system differs substantially from the civilian 
system in that it lacks an independent prosecutorial authority.68 Whereas 
charging decisions in the civilian system are left to a criminal prosecutor, 
the military vests its prosecutorial authority solely in military command-
ers.69 It is important to note that military commanders, though highly 
trained professionals, are not lawyers. Instead, commanders have the au-
thority to make disciplinary decisions as part of their duties to maintain 
good order and discipline within their units and to maintain a constant 
state of combat readiness.70 Oftentimes, the military commander plays 
the role of prosecutor, judge, and jury when administering punishment to 
members of their unit.71 Historically, this allocation of prosecutorial dis-
                                                            
 68. Diane H. Mazur, Military Values in Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 977, 995–96 
(2007). 
 69. Id. at 995. 
 70. “Commanders are responsible for both enforcing the law, protecting [s]oldiers’ rights, and 
protecting and caring for victims of crime.” THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., 
U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER’S LEGAL HANDBOOK 7 (2013) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S LEGAL 
HANDBOOK]. 
 71. “Commanders exercise great power in the military justice system. Under the Uniform Code 
[of Military Justice] they serve as convening authorities, who appoint the members of a court-martial 
and who determine whether charges against an accused shall be dismissed or shall be referred for 
trial by a general, special, or summary court-martial. Unlike a grand jury, the convening authority 
may refer charges for trial even if the officer who conducts the pretrial investigation recommends to 
the contrary. After trial, the convening authority decides whether to affirm findings of guilt and how 
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cretion has proved to be a vital tool for the military commander to ensure 
his or her unit functions effectively and meets all objectives.72 
When it comes to sexual assault within the military justice system, 
an allegation can be filed through a variety of channels.73 Ultimately, if 
unrestricted, the service’s respective criminal investigation unit will in-
vestigate the report.74 Once complete, the report regarding the investiga-
tion of the offense is given to the commanding officer of the accused.75 
Typically, at this point, most commanders consult with their service 
judge advocates.76 “The mission of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps 
is to deliver professional, candid, independent counsel and full-spectrum 
legal capabilities to command and the warfighter.”77 At this point, the 
commander, based in part on the advice from the judge advocate, makes 
the decision whether to: (1) do nothing and essentially dismiss the allega-
tion; (2) pursue nonjudicial punishment78 under Article 15 of the UCMJ; 
or (3) pursue court-martial action and prefer charges.79 Should the com-
mander decide to do nothing, his or her decision cannot be appealed by 
                                                                                                                                     
much of the sentence adjudged by the court-martial shall be approved.” Robinson O. Everett, The 
50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code, 16 CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (2001). For further discussion of the 
commander’s role in the military justice system in comparison to the civilian counterpart, see Mitsie 
Smith, Comment, Adding Force Behind Military Sexual Assault Reform: The Role of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Ending Intra-Military Sexual Assault, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 147 
(2011). 
 72. See COMMANDER’S LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 70, at 11–15. 
 73. Under the Department of Defense’s Confidentially Policy, victims of sexual offenses are 
offered two reporting options: restricted and unrestricted reporting. When an unrestricted report is 
filed, the chain of command and relevant law enforcement officials are notified. When a restricted 
report is filed, the victim remains anonymous and yet still receives access to a variety of medical and 
counseling services. For a more thorough discussion of reporting options, see Jodie Friedman, Note, 
Reporting Sexual Assault of Women in the Military, 14 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 375 (2008). 
 74. “Each branch of the military has their own investigative agency. The agency for the Army 
is the Central Investigation Division (CID). Army Regulation 10–87 Ch. 4 (2007) and Army Regula-
tion 195–2 (2009) outline the specific functions and responsibilities of the CID as investigators of all 
serious crimes within the Army. Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) operates under authori-
ty of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV). See Navy Instructions 5430.107 (2005). The Air Force 
Office of Special Investigation (OSI) operates under the direction of the Air Force Inspector General 
to conduct criminal investigation involving Air Force personnel in accordance with P. L. No. 99–
145, 99 Stat. 583 (1985), and counter-intelligence under Exec. Order 12333.” See Smith, supra note 
71. 
 75. For a comprehensive discussion of prosecutorial authority in the armed forces and the role 
of the commander, see Richard B. Cole, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Military Justice System: Is It 
Time For A Change, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 395, 399–405 (1992). 
 76. “Service Judge Advocate” is a term that describes a lawyer serving in any branch of the 
armed forces. 
 77. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCH., THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW 7 
(11th ed. 2012). 
 78. Cole, supra note 75, at 401–02. 
 79. COMMANDER’S LEGAL HANDBOOK, supra note 70, at 12–13. 
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the victim of the offense.80 Instead, the only option for the individual is 
to pursue a complaint through his or her service’s Inspector General 
component or lodge a formal congressional complaint.81 As explained 
earlier, in the analysis regarding Klay and Cioca, such decisions regard-
ing the dismissal of sexual assault complaints were rarely reviewed by 
senior officials and the disposition of complaints by low-level command-
ers was often left unquestioned.82 
Recognizing the propensity for sexual assault complaints to be dis-
missed at low levels of command, the Secretary of Defense directed (ef-
fective June 28, 2012) that the initial disposition authority in certain sex-
ual assault cases83 be elevated to “commanders who possess at least spe-
cial court-martial convening authority and who are in the O-6 grade or 
higher.”84 The purpose of this change in initial disposition authority was 
twofold. First, commanders in the rank of O-6 and above are highly sea-
soned and generally have more command experience than their lower 
ranking counterparts. Second, the Secretary of Defense wanted to ensure 
that these decisions were being made by commanders who were regular-
ly advised by legal counsel, presumably providing trained lawyers the 
opportunity to advise on issues of sufficiency of evidence.85 To date, all 
components of the Department of Defense and the National Guard Bu-
                                                            
 80. Cole, supra note 75, at 401–02. 
 81. The mission of the Department of Defense Inspector General is to “provide independent, 
relevant, and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that: supports the warfighter; promotes 
accountability, integrity, and efficiency; advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress; and informs 
the public.” Office of Inspector General, Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, http://www.dodig.mil/ 
About_Us/mission.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 82. For an analysis of this issue, see THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 58. 
 83. “Pursuant to my general court-martial convening authority under Article 22 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Rules for Courts-Martial 306, 401, and 601, I hereby withhold 
initial disposition authority from all commanders within the Department of Defense who do not 
possess at least special court-martial convening authority and who are not in the grade of O-6 (i.e., 
colonel or Navy captain) or higher, with respect to the following alleged offenses: (i) rape, in viola-
tion of Article 120; (ii) sexual assault, in violation of Article 120 of the UCMJ; (iii) forcible sodomy, 
in violation of Article 125 of the UCMJ; and (iv) all attempts to commit such offenses, in violation 
of Article 125 of the UCMJ; and (iv) all attempts to commit such offenses, in violation of Article 80. 
Additionally, this withholding applies to all other alleged offenses arising from or relating to the 
same incident(s), whether committed by the alleged perpetrator or the alleged victim of the rape, 
sexual assault, forcible sodomy, or the attempts thereof.” Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y 
of Def. to the Secy’s of the Military Dept’s, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders of 
the Combatant Commands, Inspector Gen. of the Dep’t of Def. (Apr. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/images/withhold_authority.pdf. 
 84. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE OFFICE, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 
2012, VOL. 1, 21 (2012), available at http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY12_DoD_SAPRO_ 
Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault-VOLUME_ONE.pdf. 
 85. Id. 
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reau have successfully implemented the Secretary of Defense’s di-
rective.86 
B. Article 60: The Ultimate Disposition Authority 
Another unique aspect of the military justice system recently reex-
amined by senior Department of Defense officials and Congress is the 
court-martial convening authority’s87 Article 60 power. Article 60 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice allows a court-martial convening au-
thority to dismiss a guilty verdict or change the specification on which an 
individual was found guilty to a lesser included offense.88 Prior to 2014, 
the convening authority’s only restriction in exercising this power was 
that they had to obtain and consider a written recommendation from their 
Staff Judge Advocate or legal officer.89 This power dates back to 1775 
when it was first granted to commanders of the newly formed American 
military by the Continental Congress.90 Today, however, many American 
allies have eliminated this authority due to the perception that it grants 
too much influence over the court-martial process to commanders.91 De-
spite its rare use, some top American military legal authorities maintain 
that the power is essential to maintaining good order and discipline.92 
The Air Force’s leading authority testified before the Senate Armed Ser-
vice Committee and explained that “[a] convening authority’s ability to 
exercise some accountability on every aspect of an [airman, soldier, sail-
or, etc.]’s . . . behavior is incredibly important, creating a responsive, 
disciplined force.”93 
                                                            
 86. Id. 
 87. A Court-Martial Convening Authority is a senior commissioned officer who occupies one 
of the positions specified in the UCMJ or any commander designated by the secretary of the service 
concerned or empowered by the President. For General Court-Martial Convening Authority Posi-
tions, see Article 22(a); for Special Court-Martial Convening Authority Positions, see Article 23(a)). 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 504(b)(1) discussion (2012). 
 88. UCMJ art. 60(c) (2012). Prior to amendment, the UCMJ provided: 
(3) Action on the findings of a court-martial by the convening authority or other person 
acting on the sentence is not required. However, such person, in his sole discretion, may- 
(A) dismiss any charge or specification by setting aside a finding of guilty 
thereto; or 
(B) change a finding of guilty to a charge or specification to a finding of 
guilty to an offense that is a lesser included offense of the offense stated in the 
charge or specification. 
 89. UCMJ art. 60(d) (2012). 
 90. Hagel Reviewing Appeal to Change UCMJ’s Article 60, AIR FORCE TIMES (Mar. 31, 2013), 
http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20130331/NEWS/303310005 [hereinafter Hagel]. 
 91. Allies that have made changes to limit Article 60 authority include the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, Canada, and Israel. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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This resounding call for change started with the pardoning of Lt. 
Col. James Wilkerson94 by Lt. Gen. Craig Franklin in March of 2012. 
Using his Article 60 authority, General Franklin dismissed the charges 
against Lt. Col. Wilkerson based on what the General felt was a lack of 
evidence.95 In a six-page letter addressed to then-Secretary of the Air 
Force Michael Donley, General Franklin explained his decision by stat-
ing, “After my extensive and full review of the entire body of evidence 
and my comprehensive deliberation spanning a three-week period, I only 
then finally concluded there was insufficient evidence to support a find-
ing of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”96 The letter also discusses how 
the General reviewed the clemency request, trial evidence, and trial tran-
scripts in detail, explaining: 
Letters from Lt Col and Mrs Wilkersons’ family, friends, and fellow 
military members painted a consistent picture of a person who 
adored his wife and 9-year old son, as well as a picture of a long-
serving professional Air Force officer. Some of these letters provid-
ed additional clarity to me on matters used effectively by the prose-
cution in the trial to question the character and truthfulness of both 
Lt Col Wilkerson and Mrs Wilkerson. Some letters were from peo-
ple who did not personally know the Wilkersons, but wanted to 
convey their concerns to me about the evidence and the outcome of 
the case.97  
Next, General Franklin discussed his systematic evaluation of the actual 
evidence in detail, explaining which parts of the evidence caused him to 
form his reasonable doubt as to Lt. Col. Wilkerson’s guilt—a question of 
fact typically reserved for a jury in the American trial system.98 As one 
of the listed examples states: 
                                                            
 94. “A military jury in November convicted Wilkerson, a former inspector general at Aviano 
Air Base in Italy, of aggravated sexual assault and other charges. He was sentenced to one year in 
prison and dismissal from the service. But a commander overturned the verdict and dismissed the 
charges, saying he found Wilkerson and his wife more believable than the alleged victim.” Wilker-
son was later assigned to Davis-Monthan AFB, in Tucson, AZ, where approximately half of the 
alleged victim’s family lives. Jacques Billeaud, Kimberly Hanks Stunned By Reversal of Lt. Col. 
James Wilkerson’s Conviction, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/04/25/kimberly-hanks-james-wilkerson_n_3156868.html. 
 95. Craig Whitlock, Air Force General Defends Overturning Sexual-Assault Conviction, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-10/world/38428317_1_ 
franklin-commanders-conviction. 
 96. Letter from Craig A. Franklin, Lieutenant Gen. of the U.S. Air Force to Michael B. Donley, 
U.S. Sec’y of the Air Force (Mar. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Franklin Letter], available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/135203535/Air-Force-General-explains-why-he-overturned-the-
decision-in-sexual-assault-case. 
 97. Id. at 2. 
 98. Id. at 3–4. 
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Additionally, witness testimony about the Wilkerson marriage be-
fore the night in question and in the immediate days and weeks after 
that night, showed no perceptible tension or change in their relation-
ship. Had the alleged sexual assault taken place as the alleged vic-
tim claimed, it would be reasonable to believe that their relationship 
would change and that close friends would perceive this change.99 
While General Franklin quickly pointed out in his memorandum that the 
UCMJ does not require a court-martial convening authority to offer an 
explanation of its decision,100 his explanation reads like an appellate 
court opinion with distinct conclusions regarding both questions of fact 
and law. 
This letter reveals two problems with Article 60 authority. First, 
General Franklin, though an exceptionally qualified military officer and 
fighter pilot, has minimal legal training. This fact calls into question his 
ability to make findings regarding the sufficiency of evidence, a function 
typically reserved for appellate court judges in the civilian court system. 
Second, General Franklin’s evaluation of the evidence and the resulting 
discrepancies demonstrate a chilling assumption of authority regarding 
the resolution of questions of fact, questions historically reserved in the 
American trial system for a jury. Indeed, what General Franklin saw as 
an unrequired explanation authored to explain his decisions in “the court 
of public opinion” served as direct evidence for the claim that Article 60 
authority had gone too far in allowing senior commanders to influence 
the outcomes of the American military justice system.101 
Far from a routine exercise of command authority, General Frank-
lin’s decision would provoke response from across the Department of 
Defense and Congress.102 Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Barbara 
Boxer (D-CA) called on Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to determine 
if General Franklin’s decision could be overturned by a higher authori-
                                                            
 99. Id. at 4. 
 100. Id. at 1. 
 101. See id. 
 102. General Franklin is not the only Court-Martial Convening Authority to have exercised his 
or her Article 60 authority. Lt. Gen. Susan J. Helms’ nomination to become the vice commander of 
Air Force Space Command is currently being blocked by a member of the Armed Services Commit-
tee who is requesting examination of Helms’s decision to overturn a sexual assault conviction of a 
Captain at Vandenberg Air Force Base. See Craig Whitlock, General’s Promotion Blocked over Her 
Dismissal of Sex-Assault Verdict, WASH. POST (May 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/generals-promotion-blocked-over-her-dismissal-of-sex-assault-verdict/2013/ 
05/06/ef853f8c-b64c-11e2-bd07-b6e0e6152528_story.html; see also Jennifer Steinhauer, A Sexual-
Assault Measure to Be Cut From Military Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/us/politics/proposed-measure-to-curb-sexual-assault-in-
military-to-be-cut-from-bill.html. 
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ty.103 In his response, Secretary Hagel explained that General Franklin’s 
decision could not be overruled because under the UCMJ neither the 
Secretary of Defense nor other high-ranking officials had the authority to 
alter the decision.104 Despite this unfortunate consequence, Secretary 
Hagel responded to Senator Boxer’s concerns by stating, “I believe this 
case does raise a significant question [of] whether it is necessary or ap-
propriate to place the convening authority in the position of having the 
responsibility to review the findings and sentence of a court-martial, par-
ticularly prior to the robust appellate process made available by the 
UCMJ.”105 Therefore, while nothing could be done to overturn General 
Franklin’s decision, key representatives of both the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches seemed to be in agreement that the time had come for 
reform. 
Reform would not take long, as the 2014 National Defense Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 placed new, significant limitations on a 
court-martial convening authority’s abilities under Article 60 of the 
UCMJ.106 Unlike the previous version, the current version of Article 60 
provides that should the convening authority choose to “disapprove, 
commute, or suspend, in whole or in part, the sentence of the court-
martial for an offense,” the convening authority is required to provide a 
written explanation of the reasons for such action.107 That written expla-
nation later becomes part of the trial record.108 Furthermore, the reformed 
Article 60 now provides that only “qualified offenses” are eligible for 
Article 60 review.109 A “qualified offense” is now defined as one that: (1) 
the maximum sentence of confinement that may be adjudged does not 
exceed two years; and (2) the sentence adjudged does not include dismis-
sal, a dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, or confinement for more 
than six months.110 In addition, the reformed Article 60 specifically pre-
vents any convictions under Articles 120(b) and 125 (which concern 
                                                            
 103. See Molly O’Toole, Chuck Hagel Calls For Ending Military Law Option to Overturn 
Court Martial, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/08/chuck 
-hagel-military-law_n_3040116.html. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Press Release, U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer, Boxer Encouraged by Sec’y Hagel’s Re-
sponse to Air Force Sexual Assault Case (Mar. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.boxer.senate.gov/press/release/boxer-encouraged-by-secretary-hagels-response-to-air-
force-sexual-assault-case/. 
 106. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–66, 127 Stat 
672 § 1702 (2014). 
 107. 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(2)(C) (2014). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(3)(D) (2014). 
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sexual assault) from being reviewed and dismissed by a court-martial 
convening authority.111 
While it is still too soon to predict how the current Article 60 will 
be used in the administration of military justice, the recent reform repre-
sents a commitment from both key Executive and Legislative officials to 
balance the individual rights of service members with the military com-
mander’s need to maintain a responsive, disciplined force. At present, 
court-martial convening authorities still retain some ability to modify 
court-martial results. This broad power, however, is now tempered by 
restrictions that prohibit alteration of jury verdicts (except via the mili-
tary appellate court process) for the most heinous crimes. 
C. Article 120 Reform: When Protection Became Unconstitutional 
Calling for legislation to amend Article 60 authority has not been 
the Department of Defense’s sole reaction to the perceived inability of 
the UCMJ to serve the needs of sexual assault victims. Since 2004, the 
Department of Defense and Congress have enacted several other reforms 
in an attempt to improve the functioning of the military justice process. 
While the DoD has frequently been accused of not doing enough to en-
sure appropriate responses to crimes of sexual misconduct are taken, 
some now argue that recent reforms in the military justice system have 
gone too far. In particular, changes to the offense structure of Article 120 
of the UCMJ (the primary article under which charges for sexual offens-
es are brought) has led to several questions of whether the protections 
extended to victims have gone too far in that they infringe on the consti-
tutional rights of the accused.112 The recent history of the U.S. military 
sexual assault statute embodies the struggle to find the perfect balance 
between the rights of victims to seek justice and the rights of perpetrators 
to remain innocent until proven guilty. This section chronicles this strug-
gle through the evolution of Article 120, the Article primarily used to 
prosecute sexual offenses in the armed forces. 
Prior to 2007, Article 120 of the UCMJ defined the crime of rape as 
“an act of sexual intercourse by force and without consent.”113 Therefore, 
in order to obtain a conviction, the prosecution was required to prove two 
                                                            
 111. 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(3)(D)(ii)(II) (2014). 
 112. See, e.g., Lieutenant Keith B. Lofland, The Neglected Debate Over Sexual Assault Policy 
in the Department of Defense, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 311, 319 (2008); Brigadier General (Ret.) Jack 
Nevin & Lieutenant Joshua R. Lorenz, Neither a Model of Clarity Nor a Model Statute: An Analysis 
of the History, Challenges, and Suggested Changes to the “New” Article 120, 67 A.F. L. REV. 269 
(2011). 
 113. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES app. 27, 45(a) (2012), available at 
http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/mcm.pdf. 
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elements: (1) that the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse and 
(2) that the act of sexual intercourse was done by force and without con-
sent.114 Despite the attractiveness of its simplicity, modern military 
courts found the pre-2007 Article 120 to be ill-fitted to the reality of the 
types of sexual crimes that were occurring throughout the armed forces: 
Article 120 is antiquated in its approach to sexual offenses. In par-
ticular, the article does not reflect the more recent trend for rape 
statutes to recognize gradations in the offense based on context. 
These [recent rape] statutes incorporate the legal realization that the 
force used may vary depending on the relationship and familiarity, 
if any, between perpetrator and victim, but the essence of the of-
fense remains the same—sexual intercourse against the will of the 
victim. Because Article 120 is dated, its elements may not easily fit 
the range of circumstances now generally recognized as “rape,” in-
cluding date rape, acquaintance rape, statutory rape, as well as 
stranger-on-stranger rape.115 
In advance of any congressional action, military courts established a va-
riety of case law to supplement Article 120’s inability to deal with the 
complexities of modern sexual crimes.116 Congressional action came 
with the signing of the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), which required the Secretary of Defense to improve “issues 
relating to sexual assault” and align military justice provisions “more 
closely to other Federal laws and regulations.”117 
In response to the call for change, the Department of Defense 
tasked a subcommittee of the Joint Service Committee to study the pos-
sible effects of any changes to the UCMJ. 118 Despite the fact that the 
subcommittee unanimously recommended against any changes to the 
UCMJ—asserting that “any rationale for significant change [would be] 
outweighed by the confusion and disruption that such change would 
cause”119—change came in 2006 when the President signed the NDAA 
into law, which included a complete rewrite of Article 120.120 The se-
cond version of Article 120 applies to sexual offenses committed during 
                                                            
 114. Id. 
 115. United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 116. See id. See also United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368 (C.A.A.F. 2003); United States v. 
Palmer, 33 M.J. 7 (C.M.A. 1991); United States v. Henderson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 268 (1954). 
 117. Nevin & Lorenz, supra note 112, at 277. 
 118. See id. at 278. The Joint Service Committee is responsible for reviewing the Manual for 
Courts-Martial and proposing any changes to the UCMJ. Id. The committee is comprised of both 
civilian and military legal representation. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 278–79. 
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the period of October 1, 2007 through June 27, 2012; this version re-
sponded to judicial critiques by dividing the crimes of rape, sexual as-
sault, and other sexual misconduct into a range of offenses that took into 
account the surrounding circumstances of the crime.121 With regard to the 
creation of several new independent sexual offenses, the reform was 
generally accepted as it seemed to bring Article 120 into the modern age 
with regard to the prevailing legal views.122 
Unfortunately, this benefit was soon overshadowed by the realiza-
tion that the wording of the new article provided for an unconstitutional 
shift in the burden of proof regarding the element of consent. The pre-
2007 Article 120 listed a “lack of consent” as one of the elements neces-
sary to obtain a conviction of rape.123 The post-2007 Article 120 now 
required only one element to prove the crime of rape by using force: 
“that the accused causes another person, who is of any age, to engage in 
a sexual act by using force against that other person.”124 In other words, 
pre-2007, the prosecution was required to prove lack of consent in order 
to obtain a conviction. Post-2007, the defense was required to plead and 
prove consent as an affirmative defense since lack of consent was no 
longer an element of the crime.125 As the UCMJ explained in Article 
120(t)(16), “[t]he accused has the burden of proving the affirmative de-
fense by a preponderance of evidence. After the defense meets this bur-
den, the prosecution shall have the burden of proving beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the affirmative defense did not exist.”126 
The government’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all 
elements of the crime charged is a fundamental principle of the Ameri-
can justice system.127 As such, the burden shift required by the post-2007 
                                                            
 121. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES app. 28, 45a (2012). For example, the 
crime of rape (not including the offenses regarding the rape of a child) was now divided into five 
distinct offenses: rape by using force, rape by causing grievous bodily harm, rape by using threats or 
placing in fear, rape by rendering another unconscious, and rape by administration of drug, intoxi-
cant, or other similar substance. Id. In addition, similar provisions within Article 120 were added for 
the crimes of sexual assault and other sexual misconduct. Id. This is in comparison with the pre-2007 
Article 120, which only listed the crimes of Rape and Carnal Knowledge. Id. app. 27, 45a (2012). 
 122. See, e.g., Nevin & Lorenz, supra note 112. 
 123. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES app. 27, 45a (2012). 
 124. Id. app. 28, 45a. 
 125. “Lack of permission is an element of the offense in subsection (m) (wrongful sexual con-
tact). Consent and mistake of fact as to consent are not an issue, or an affirmative defense, in a pros-
ecution under any other subsection, except they are an affirmative defense for the sexual conduct in 
issue in a prosecution under subsection (a) (rape), subsection (c) (aggravated sexual assault), subsec-
tion (e) (aggravated sexual contact), and subsection (h) (abusive sexual contact).” Id. app. 28, 45r 
(emphasis added). 
 126. Id. app. 28, 45(t)(16). 
 127. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). 
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Article 120 produced a number of appeals alleging violations of the de-
fendant’s constitutional right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.128 At first, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces grounded 
its analysis on the principle that the legislature possessed the authority to 
define the elements of an offense and could, as long as the definition did 
not violate constitutional due process guarantees, force the defendant to 
bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense.129 The court noted that 
the legislative purpose behind the new offense structure was to “change 
the focus of the criminal process away from an inquiry into the state of 
mind or acts of the victim to an inquiry into the conduct of the ac-
cused.”130 Furthermore, the court concluded that any evidence of consent 
could also be used to provide a reasonable doubt regarding the element 
of force.131 In sum, the court concluded that the Constitution permitted 
the legislature “to place the burden on the defendant to establish an af-
firmative defense, even if the evidence necessary to prove the defense 
may also raise a reasonable doubt about an element of the offense.”132 
Therefore, while the post-2007 Article 120 was “neither a model of clari-
ty nor a model statute,”133 it was nonetheless constitutional.134 
Yet only a year later, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
began to shift its thinking with regard to the constitutionality of placing 
the burden of proving consent as an affirmative defense on the defendant. 
Decided in 2011, U.S. v. Prather involved an airman who was convicted 
by court-martial of violating Article 120(c)—aggravated sexual assault 
upon a person substantially incapacitated or substantially incapable of 
appraising the act, declining participation or communicating unwilling-
ness.135 Due to the statutory construction of the elements of the offense, 
Prather highlighted a significant problem regarding the interplay of sec-
tions within the post-2007 version of the article: “If an accused proves 
that the victim consented, he has necessarily proven that the victim had 
the capacity to consent, which logically results in the accused having 
disproven an element of the offense of aggravated sexual assault—that 
                                                            
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 69 M.J. 462 (C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v. Prather, 
69 M.J. 338 (C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v. Neal, 68 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2010). 
 129. Neal, 68 M.J. at 298. 
 130. Id. at 301 (quoting Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1009 (D.C. 1997)). Russell, 
though decided in 1997, considered a sexual misconduct statute with an affirmative defense compo-
nent where the defendant bore the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence similar 
to that found in the post-2007 Article 120. Id. 
 131. Neal, 68 M.J. at 304. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 305. 
 134. Id. at 304. 
 135. United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338 (C.A.A.F. 2011). 
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the victim was substantially incapacitated.”136 As such, the court held 
that the combined effects of Article 120 (c)(2), Article 120 (t)(14), and 
Article 120(t)(16) resulted in an unconstitutional burden shift to the ac-
cused.137 In what appeared to be a resounding call for change, the Pra-
ther court further negated the possibility of any type of curative jury in-
struction to compensate for the statute’s flaws: 
The problem with the provision is structural. If the trier of fact has 
found that the defense has proven an affirmative defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, it is legally impossible for the prosecu-
tion to then disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt and there must be a finding of not guilty. There are simply no 
instructions that could guide members through this quagmire, save 
an instruction that disregards the provision.138 
Only four years after being signed into law, the post-2007 Article 120 
was again up for reform. While prosecutors and judges generally liked 
the modern classification of sexual offenses, which allowed for defini-
tional variation based on the circumstances of the crime, the unconstitu-
tional burden shift created by regarding consent as an affirmative defense 
was unacceptable. What was needed was a hybrid of the pre-2007 and 
post-2007 Article 120, maintaining the modern classification of sexual 
offenses, all the while ensuring the preservation of the defendant’s due 
process rights. 
In December 2009, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in 
the Military (DTFSAMS) reinforced the call for reform from military 
courts by recommending that Article 120 be reformed once more due to 
the unconstitutional burden-shifting and because it was a “cumbersome 
and confusing” statute.139 On June 28, 2012, the 2012 National Defense 
Authorization Act formally replaced the post-2007 Article 120 with a 
new post-2012 version entitled “Rape and sexual assault generally.”140 
While keeping the additional levels of classification for sexual offenses 
based on the circumstances of the crime, the post-2012 Article 120 con-
tained four major reforms: (1) it removed child sexual offenses and mis-
cellaneous sexual misconduct from the statute (placing them instead in 
the newly created Articles 120(b) and 120(c)); (2) it addressed the consti-
tutional problems identified by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forc-
                                                            
 136. Id. at 343. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 345. 
 139. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES app. 23, at A23-15 (2012). 
 140. Id. 
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es; (3) it expanded the definition of “sexual act” to make the offense 
gender-neutral; and (4) it simplified the overall statutory scheme.141 
Unlike the pre-2007 Article 120, lack of consent is still not listed as 
an element requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction.142 
Instead, the post-2012 Article 120 preserves the offender-centric focus of 
its predecessor by including a more complete definition of “force” that 
removes all victim-centric language and no longer forces the victim to 
resist the assault.143 The unconstitutional burden shift is eliminated, how-
ever, as consent is no longer listed as a statutory-specific defense to the 
crime.144 In fact, all statutory-specific defenses are eliminated and are 
instead replaced with Article 120(f), which allows the accused to raise 
“any applicable defenses available under this chapter or the Rules for 
Court-Martial.”145 Because there is no general defense of consent within 
the UCMJ, consent is no longer a defense to a sexual crime under Article 
120.146 While evidence of consent may still be admitted in order to raise 
reasonable doubt regarding any of the elements involving force, since 
consent is no longer a defense, it is no longer required to be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.147 Therefore, in accordance with the due pro-
cess mandates of the Constitution and longstanding American criminal 
law jurisprudence, the defendant no longer bears the burden of proof re-
garding any element of the crime. 
                                                            
 141. Id. 
 142. At the time of publishing the 2012 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial, the President 
had yet to prescribe the subparagraphs that would normally address the elements of the crime, expla-
nations, etc., pursuant to his rule making authority under Article 36. UCMJ art. 120 (2012). The 
current statutory definition of the crime of rape reads as follows: 
(a) Rape— Any person subject to this chapter who commits a sexual act upon another 
person by— 
(1) using unlawful force against that other person; 
(2) using force causing or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to any 
person; 
(3) threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be sub-
jected to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping; 
(4) first rendering that other person unconscious; or 
(5) administering to that person by force or threat of force, or without the 
knowledge or consent of that person a drug, intoxicant, or other similar sub-
stance and thereby substantially impairing the ability of that other person to 
appraise or control conduct; 
is guilty of rape and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2013). 
 143. See JIM CLARK, ANALYSIS OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES 2012 UCMJ ARTICLE 120 (2012), 
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20120705060050_large.pdf. 
 144. Id. at 7. 
 145. 10 U.S.C. § 920(f) (2013). 
 146. CLARK, supra note 143, at 7. 
 147. Id. at 8–9. 
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Naturally, it is too soon to tell whether the post-2012 Article 120 is 
a “model of clarity or a model statute.”148 What the post-2012 Article 
120 does represent, however, is an evolution in the military justice sys-
tem’s thinking about the general nature of sexual offenses. Some critics 
would point to the immediate reform of the post-2007 Article 120 as evi-
dence that critics were correct in arguing the original Joint Service 
Committee’s recommendation in 2005 that reform was unnecessary. De-
spite this, the fact remains that the newly reformed Article 120 not only 
brings the military justice system more in line with prevailing state and 
federal statutes, it also gives military prosecutors a greater range of op-
tions when dealing with the highly fact-specific nature of sexual offens-
es, thereby enabling them to seek justice for victims in ways never before 
available. Perhaps more important is the speed at which reform occurred; 
rarely in recent years have the American people seen both the Executive 
and Legislative Branches of government come together in a relatively 
short time frame and aggressively enact progressive reform. As such, the 
story of Article 120 provides a glimmer of hope by acting as a model for 
continued reform of the military justice system. When viewed in combi-
nation, the evolution from the pre-2007 Article 120 to the post-2012 Ar-
ticle 120 represents a commitment by all involved to preserving both the 
rights of the victim and the rights of the accused. 
V. THE NEED FOR A MORE INFORMED DEBATE 
A. Why Small-Scale Reforms Simply Are Not Enough and the Current 
Legislative Debate 
As discussed above, the armed forces have now been actively en-
gaged in battling sexual assault within their ranks for over two decades. 
This Note merely highlights a select few of the many institutional pro-
grams, policies, and changes that have come about in the past twenty 
years. Sadly, however, the 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey 
of Active Duty Members reveals that there is still a significant lack of 
faith in the military justice system.149 Of the women who experienced 
unwanted sexual contact,150 67% elected to not file any type of report to a 
                                                            
 148. See Nevin & Lorenz, supra note 112. 
 149. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CTR., 2012 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY 
OF ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS 3 (2013), http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/research/2012_Workplace_ 
and_Gender_Relations_Survey_of_Active_Duty_Members-Survey_Note_and_Briefing.pdf. 
 150. The survey also reports that of the total number of male service members who experi-
enced unwanted sexual contact in 2012, only 10% reported to some form of military authority. The 
primary reasons for male service members not reporting to military authorities were unlisted. Id. at 
4. 
2015] Sexual Assault Reform Within the U.S. Military 1165 
military authority.151 The main reasons given for not reporting the inci-
dent were that 70% did not want anyone to know, 66% felt uncomforta-
ble making a report, and 51% did not think their report would be kept 
confidential.152 Even more shocking is the fact that these numbers, for 
the most part, remain unchanged from similar surveys conducted in 2006 
and 2010.153 In addition to describing the current state of sexual assault 
in the military, these numbers provide clear support for the idea that fur-
ther reforms are necessary. 
When viewed in combination with the issues discussed in Part IV, it 
is apparent how certain structural elements in the military justice system 
would cause a victim of sexual assault to be apprehensive about report-
ing the offense. The determination of whether the case even goes to trial 
rests with a military commander who is most often in the victim’s or the 
alleged offender’s chain of command. The guidelines in the Manual for 
Court-Martial explain that “[i]f the convening authority finds or is ad-
vised by a judge advocate that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that an offense triable by court-martial has been committed and that the 
accused committed it, and that the specification alleges an offense, the 
convening authority may refer it.”154 By using the word “may,” the 
guidelines provide that the commander is not bound by any authority to 
refer the case to a court-martial and remains free to dispose of the case in 
another fashion, as discussed previously.  
The role of the military commander is and has always been central 
to the maintenance of good order and discipline.155 As such, there have 
traditionally been few calls for change to the role of the commander 
within the military justice system. The question of whether the com-
mander has too much authority in the decision to prefer charges is not a 
new debate. As one scholar concluded in 1992: 
Leaving prosecutorial discretion in the hands of the commanding 
officer will best serve the ends of justice and discipline. The mili-
tary commander has a broader range of alternatives available for 
handling a case than does the civilian prosecutor. He appears also to 
                                                            
 151. Id. at 3. For a discussion of the difference between restricted and unrestricted reporting 
options available to service members, see Friedman, supra note 73. 
 152. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CTR., supra note 149, at 3. 
 153. “Of the 67% of women who did not report to a military authority, the main reasons they 
chose not to report the incident were: they did not want anyone to know (70%; unchanged from 2006 
and 2010), they felt uncomfortable making a report (66%; unchanged from 2006 and 2010), and they 
did not think their report would be kept confidential (51%; unchanged from 2010).” Id. 
 154. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 601(d)(1)(2012) (emphasis 
added). 
 155. See Cole, supra note 76, at 410. 
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have access to far more information about the individual accused, 
through extensive records, information from supervisors, and often 
(at smaller commands) personal familiarity with the accused. The 
combination of this range of options, wealth of information, and the 
legal advice of his trial counsel places him in an ideal position to 
exercise his prosecutorial discretion in a just manner.156 
The argument comes back to the notion discussed in Part III that there 
are unique concerns involved with military justice centering on the “spe-
cial relationship” between the soldier and his or her commanding of-
ficer.157 Arguments in favor of the current system center on the idea that 
military commanders are better equipped than a civilian prosecutor to 
make the charging decision for two reasons: (1) they are a member of the 
same community as the alleged perpetrator and the victim,158 and (2) mil-
itary commanders are better equipped to take into account the unique 
ends of ensuring unit morale and discipline to achieve military objec-
tives.159 
However, what was once a forgone conclusion—that the military 
commander should play a central role in prosecutorial discretion—has 
recently come up for debate with dramatically different results. In 2013, 
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), chairwoman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee’s personnel panel, proposed the Military Justice Im-
provement Act,160 a bill that would fundamentally alter the central role of 
the commander in the military justice system. The Act moves the deci-
sion to prosecute any crime punishable by one year or more in confine-
ment to “independent, trained, professional military prosecutors.”161 
                                                            
 156. Id. 
 157. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143–46 (1950). 
 158. Thomas G. Becker, In Defense of American Military Justice…Again: Is Congress Giving 
the Military Justice System a Fair Shake?, 40 NO. 1 THE REPORTER 6, 9 (2013). 
 159. See supra Part III. 
 160. Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 161. Comprehensive Resource Center for the Military Justice Improvement Act, 
http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). The Military Justice Improve-
ment Act reads: 
Personnel. The personnel of each office established under paragraph (1) shall consist of 
such members of the Armed Forces and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, 
or such members of the Coast Guard or civilian personnel of the Department of Home-
land Security, as may be detailed or assigned to the office by the Chief of Staff or Com-
mandant concerned. The members and personnel so detailed or assigned, as the case may 
be, shall be detailed or assigned from personnel billets in existence on the date of the en-
actment of this Act. 
Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 967, 113th Cong. § 4(c)(2). The Act would exempt crimes that 
are “uniquely military in nature” such as absent without leave, disobeying orders, etc. Comprehen-
sive Resource Center for the Military Justice Improvement Act, http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/ 
mjia (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
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However, the Act would not amend Article 15 and still allows com-
manders to order nonjudicial punishment for lesser offenses not directed 
to trial by this newly created independent prosecutorial authority.162 
As expected, Senator Gillibrand’s proposal faced strict opposition 
from top military and Armed Services Committee leaders.163 In March of 
2014, Senator Gillibrand’s proposal fell five votes short of the sixty votes 
needed to overcome a filibuster and move forward for a straight up-or-
down vote.164 Despite strong opposition from the armed forces, many 
were surprised at the vast amount of support that Senator Gillibrand gen-
erated from legislators and victim advocate groups alike.165 Furthermore, 
although they appear to be stalled at the moment, companion bills that 
have been introduced in the House of Representatives seem to signify 
that the notion of eliminating prosecutorial discretion from military 
commanders has gained significant support since the discussion first 
started in the early 1990s.166 
Another signal that opinions on Capitol Hill regarding military jus-
tice appear to be changing is the Senate’s recent passage of the Victims 
Protection Act of 2014.167 The bill,168 introduced by Senator Claire 
McCaskill (D-MO), requires several key changes to way in which sexual 
assault crimes are handled within the military justice system, including 
but not limited to: (1) mandating collaboration between the Department 
of Justice and the Department of Defense in efforts to prevent and re-
spond to sexual assault;169 (2) eliminating the admissibility of evidence 
regarding the general military character of an accused for the purpose of 
showing the probability of the innocence of the accused (the so-called 
“good soldier” defense);170 and (3) establishing a process to ensure that 
consultation with the victim of a sexual offense occurs with “respect to 
                                                            
 162. Id. 
 163. Stacy Kaper, Kirsten Gillibrand Blames White House in Failure of Military Sexual-
Assault Bill, NAT’L J. (Mar 6. 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/kirsten-gillibrand-
blames-white-house-in-failure-of-military-sexual-assault-bill-20140306; Leo Shane III, Senate Ap-
proves McCaskill Sex Assault Bill, MIL. TIMES (Mar. 10 2014), http://www.militarytimes.com/article 
/20140310/NEWS05/303100027/Senate-approves-McCaskill-sex-assault-bill. 
 164. Shane, supra note 163. 
 165. Kaper, supra note 163. 
 166. Id. (“A companion House bill to Gillibrand’s from GOP Rep. Dan Benishek of Michigan 
has 71 cosponsors but has gone nowhere. Another bill from Democratic Rep. Jackie Speier of Cali-
fornia . . . has 157 cosponsors. It would also remove commanders from the decision to prosecute 
sexual assaults and would place jurisdiction in the newly created, autonomous Sexual Assault Over-
sight and Response Office, which is comprised of civilian and military experts.”). 
 167. Shane, supra note 163. 
 168. Victims Protection Act of 2014, S. 1917, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 169. See id. § 5(a)(1-5). 
 170. See id. § 3(g). 
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the victim’s preference as to whether the offense should be prosecuted by 
court-martial or by a civilian court with jurisdiction over the offense.”171 
In what has been billed as a “battle” between two of the leading 
women of the Senate, several criticize Senator McCaskill’s plan as not 
going far enough to ensure protection for victims.172 Yet at the same 
time, Senator Gillibrand’s proposal, which has still failed to gain the 
necessary support to pass the Senate, has drawn sharp criticism from mil-
itary leaders who claim that it amounts to a “dismantling of the military’s 
judiciary.”173 While both proposals represent what appear to be, at first 
glance, gains in terms of providing a military justice system that is fair to 
victims and alleged perpetrators alike, the most important distinction be-
tween the two is the ability of the military commander to prefer charges. 
As a result, the highly political and emotional debate regarding the mili-
tary commander’s ability to exercise this tremendous power in the mili-
tary judicial system rages on. 
B. So Where Do We Go From Here? 
The debate needs to change. Instead of focusing on whether mili-
tary commanders are able to exercise prosecutorial discretion in a fair 
and just manner, the question that needs to be examined is whether mili-
tary commanders are in fact the best entities in the armed forces to exer-
cise this power, as opposed to civilian counterparts or the Judge Advo-
cate General Corps. In other words, this debate should not be about 
whether commanders should or can make a fair charging decision, but 
instead, should center on the notion of whether placing the charging de-
cision in the military commander’s hands is the best use of existing mili-
tary capabilities. Unfortunately, and yet understandably, due to the high-
ly charged emotional nature of the topic, the tremendous responsibility of 
the armed forces, and the historical importance of the role of the military 
commander, any discussion of this topic runs the risk of evolving into a 
highly charged debate that will only serve to further entrench participants 
in their current views. The Associated Press described the Senate floor 
during debate over Senator Gillibrand’s bill: “One by one, proponents 
and opponents of [Senator Gillibrand’s proposal] stood on the Senate 
                                                            
 171. Id. § 3(b)(1). The Act later provides that the victim’s preference should be given “great 
weight” in determining whether the offense will be tried at a court-martial or the corresponding 
civilian authority. Id. § 3(b)(2). 
 172. In fact, Gillibrand’s effort divided the Senate in ways that “smashed conventional lines on 
both gender and political party.” Donna Cassata, Senate Blocks Change to Military Sex Assault 
Cases, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 6, 2014, 2:04 PM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2014/mar/06/ 
senate-blocks-change-military-sex-assault-cases/. See also Shane, supra note 163. 
 173. Shane, supra note 163. 
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floor and passionately argued based on personal experiences, growing 
frustration with what they dismissed as fixes around the edges and horrif-
ic stories from the ranks.”174 
The arguments of both sides are relatively simple and easy to un-
derstand. On one hand, proponents of an independent prosecutorial au-
thority cite the ever-increasing amount of sexual assault within the ranks 
and argue that the present military justice system continues to fail men 
and women in uniform.175 On the other hand, opponents who favor keep-
ing the charging decision in the hands of the military commander cite the 
central and historical importance of a judicial system that maintains mili-
tary effectiveness.176 One side looks to the individual, to the service 
member who has been a victim of a heinous crime and has subsequently 
been denied justice. The other looks to the collective, to the effectiveness 
of the armed forces and their ability to stand ready to protect and defend 
the nation at a moment’s notice. Both arguments are strong, both sides 
are informed, and both interests are of the upmost importance. So how 
exactly does one decide a structural change to the military justice sys-
tem? Furthermore, should this decision be made by a Congress with the 
lowest percentage of veterans since World War II?177 
C. The Importance of the Decisionmaking Process—AFSO 21 and  
Beyond 
Behind every decision, no matter how large or small, is a process. 
Though often ignored, decisionmaking processes play an important role 
in the final outcome. In a recent interview, former Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor remarked that the thing she liked about the judici-
ary, compared to the other branches of government, was that the judici-
ary was the sole branch of government that was required to justify all of 
its decisions in writing.178 Demonstrating the thought process that went 
into a decision is vital to providing legitimacy to that decision and gain-
ing its acceptance, especially if that decision is unpopular. This is what is 
                                                            
 174. Cassata, supra note 172. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Jennifer Rizzo, Veterans in Congress at Lowest Level Since World War II, CNN (Jan. 21 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/01/20/congress.veterans/. “Only 20% of the 535 members of 
the new Congress have served in the military, 25 from the Senate and 90 from the House of Repre-
sentatives. Juxtapose that with 1975, when over 70% of those elected had served in the armed forc-
es.” Id. 
 178. Interview by Jon Stewart with Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, on 
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/gl2 
yls/sandra-day-o-connor-pt—2. 
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currently lacking in the debate regarding the commander’s role in the 
military justice system. As explained earlier, commanders have played a 
central role in the administration of military justice since pre-
Revolutionary War times. If this role is to be changed, then a sufficient 
justification will go a long way in obtaining support.179 This Note con-
tends that individual narratives concerning individual victims of sexual 
assault and denials of justice, though horrifying and compelling, will not 
be enough to justify a massive overhaul of military justice administration 
in the minds of military commanders and invoke much-needed support 
for this change. What is desperately needed in this debate is a 
decisionmaking process and an organized study focused on capabilities 
as opposed to highly emotional rhetoric. 
In order to propose a massive overhaul of the military justice sys-
tem and provide a justification for taking away the historic ability of 
commanders to make charging decisions, the best mechanism is to use a 
decisionmaking process with which military leaders are already familiar. 
Several processes already exist within the armed forces to analyze and 
realign capabilities in the most effective and efficient way possible.180 
While each of these processes have their strengths and weaknesses, all 
share an emphasis on technical analysis and provide a roadmap for 
decisionmaking. Viewing the benefits of one of these processes as an 
example, the U.S. Air Force’s AFSO 21181 highlights the importance of 
using an organized, technical approach to military justice reform. 
D. AFSO 21—A Technical Analysis of Military Justice 
Ultimately, the military justice system is a process—a process that 
is used to determine the guilt or innocence of a particular individual and 
                                                            
 179. Determining whether or not prosecutorial discretion should be removed from commanders 
is beyond the scope of this Note. For argumentation that the prosecutorial discretion should remain 
in the hands of commanders, see Cole, supra note 75. For arguments in opposition, see Kaper, supra 
note 163. 
 180. See infra Part V.D. 
 181. “AFSO21 is an improvement model customized to the unique environment of the United 
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the applicable punishment, if necessary. AFSO 21 is a process improve-
ment tool developed and currently utilized by the U.S. Air Force to both 
analyze processes and suggest improvements.182 While originally de-
signed to study industrial processes, there is much benefit to be had in 
thinking about the military justice system in a technical way. This is be-
cause there will always be bad commanders who abuse the system, just 
like there will always be bad prosecutors, defense attorneys, and civic 
leaders. However, systemic changes cannot be justified solely by anecdo-
tal narratives regarding individual failures. Instead, there are two primary 
reasons why a technical decisionmaking process such as AFSO 21 
should be used: (1) these types of processes provide for the identification 
of all relevant stakeholders, and (2) technical processes developed with 
industry objectives in mind are designed to produce “better” products or, 
in this case, increasingly accurate convictions and dismissals. 
When speaking to reporters prior to the passage of her bill in the 
Senate, Senator McCaskill explained that “[t]he argument was posed as 
victims versus commanders and whose side are you on . . . it’s not that 
simple.”183 This is why the identification of all relevant stakeholders is 
important before implementation of any major reform. With any system-
ic change, identification of key stakeholders, including their expectations 
regarding the change and the development of an effective communica-
tion plan, is essential.184 In this instance, the current debate centers 
around senior military commanders and victims. Yet mechanisms such as 
AFSO 21 and other related processes provide “toolkits” for identifying 
all relevant stakeholders and recognition of their value within the pro-
cess.185 In this context, there are several additional parties, such as the 
Judge Advocate General Corps (namely whether they have the training 
and experience to properly make charging decisions), servicemen and 
women who have not been victims of sexual assault (their opinions on 
who should initiate military justice proceedings in sexual offenses), and 
civilian prosecutors (as jurisdictional issues can arise in crimes involving 
military members that occur off-base, etc.) whose inputs should be con-
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sidered. These are only a handful of the key stakeholders whose interests 
must be accounted for if any major reform is to occur. If the debate is 
allowed to continue in a polarized fashion, without considering these ad-
ditional important interests, then any major military justice system 
change could ultimately fail due to important considerations that were 
never accounted for from the onset. Attempting to change any process, 
whether industrial or legal, without first identifying all of the key con-
tributors and their interests in an organized fashion is a recipe for failure. 
Ultimately, the goal of any justice system is to ensure an accurate 
result. Six Sigma is a well-known project management and problem-
solving mechanism, which is embedded within AFSO 21 and focuses on 
reducing product defects.186 While it is far from traditional to think of a 
conviction (or a dismissal) as a “product,” in essence, a conviction is 
nothing more than a “product” of the military justice system. As such, 
the goal of the system should be to produce the best “products” in the 
form of accurate, timely convictions. Sadly, with any system, there will 
be failures. However, the current debate focuses on these failures and 
attempts to use them as justification for large-scale reforms. While indi-
vidual narratives are important to consider and call attention to an im-
portant issue, the distinction must be made between a bad process and a 
bad actor within that process. As stated earlier, though few and far be-
tween, there will always be military commanders who will exercise their 
authority for unjust ends. Yet, at the same time, no matter who makes the 
charging decision—a commander, civilian prosecutor, or Judge Advo-
cate—there will always be bad actors within a system. A technical analy-
sis, such as Six Sigma, is key to making the distinction between bad ac-
tors and a bad process. 
In sum, there are two primary benefits to using a technical 
decisionmaking process when determining whether large-scale reform of 
the current military justice system is necessary. Regardless of the nature 
of the process at hand, the identification of all relevant stakeholders and 
a focus on “product” variance to determine a bad actor versus a bad pro-
cess are key to ensuring the success of any proposed large-scale change. 
In the context of the military justice system, especially when talking 
about altering the role of the military commander that dates back to pre-
Revolutionary War times, technical decisionmaking processes provide 
substantial justification for change in a way that individual narratives 
cannot. Without this justification, any large-scale change runs the risk of 
untimely failure due to an overall lack of a perceived need for change. 
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Naturally, when the two interests at stake are as compelling as individual 
justice and national security, any unnecessary risk cannot be tolerated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Note has been twofold: to chronicle recent 
events in the U.S. Military’s ongoing battle against sexual assault within 
the ranks, including several recent reforms to the military justice system, 
and to advocate for the use of a technical decisionmaking process, versus 
reliance on individual narratives, when considering the idea of major re-
form that removes a military commander’s charging decision authority. 
Through the use of individual statistics and a brief overview of the major 
sexual assault scandals that have affected the armed forces in recent 
years, Part II demonstrated that sexual assault continues to be a problem 
within the U.S. military. In the search for a solution to this problem, 
Parts III and IV showcased the difficult nature of the problem itself. Bal-
ancing national security interests with the interests of the individual ser-
vice member in seeking relief for harms suffered has proven to be far 
from simple. While civilian courts have stood firm in their reluctance to 
“run the Army,” small-scale reforms made by the Legislature and the 
Executive demonstrate that both branches of government are committed 
to military justice reform. Part V further demonstrated this commitment 
by chronicling the recent legislative debate and concluded with a word of 
caution against using individual narratives to justify large-scale changes, 
advocating instead for the use of a technical decisionmaking process to 
ensure that bad actors are not mistaken for a bad system. 
To Plato, the notion of a guardian needing a guard was absurd.187 
Yet today, it remains tragically clear that enemy forces are not the sole 
threat members of the U.S. military face, both on the battlefield and in 
garrison. By enacting tempered and intelligent military justice reform 
through the use of tailored, technical decisionmaking processes, the U.S. 
Congress can best fulfill its role as the guardians of those who guard the 
nation. Throughout history, when the tasks at hand were difficult, the 
solutions far from simple, or the objectives anything but clear, the men 
and women of the U.S. military fulfilled, and continue to fulfill, their 
roles as guardians. As such, these service members and their families 
have the right to demand the same diligence and dedication from the U.S. 
Congress in enacting reform. 
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